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Credit programs for the rural poor have emerged in most low 
income countries (LICs) the past twenty years. Initially this 
involved installing institutions like credit unions, credit 
cooperatives, and supervised credit programs that had been suc-
cessful in high income countries. Only a few of these institu-
tional transplants, however, have taken root and flowered. 
As a result, financial innovations have recently emerged in 
low income countries that attempt to improve the access of the 
1 t f . . 1 . 1/ rura poor o 2nanc2a serv2ces.- These include door-to-door 
collection of savings deposits by commercial banks, low cost 
rural bank branches, mobile banks, area development programs 
with credit as part of a package of services, blanket credit 
programs that lend to a large proportion of the rural poor in 
* Professor and former Research Associate, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University. The Agency for International Development pro-
vided, funds used in carrying out this research. The staff 
Qf the Dominican Development Foundation, especially Camilo 
H. Suero and Rafael A. Abreu R., were very gracious in allow-
ing us to study their activities. Their candor allor.-Jed us 
to analyze problems, common to many small farmer credit pro-
grams, that are often hidden. We hope we have not abused 
their trust. 
Innovations are used here to indicate any change in operations 
of the financial intermediary. The innovation may be either 
cost decreasing or cost increasing for the intermediary 
and/or society. 
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an area, and group lending. While many of these innovations 
appear to be very promising when initiated, most do not mature 
beyond the pilot project phase. Often~ within several years 
of initiation, the aims of the innovation are not met, policy-
makers become frustrated, and the pilot project is abandoned 
or the original objectives of serving the rural poor are ig-
nored. One must expect attrition in innovations, but the 
!'ailure rate in rural financial markets is disturbingly high. 
We suggest in the following discussion one explanation 
for why financial market innovations fail and illustrate our 
argument with information drawn from a study of group lending 
in the Dominican Republic. Our aim is to identify factors 
that have limited the success of a promising group lending 
program and draw conclusions that may be useful in a number 
of other low income countries experimenting with loans to 
groups. We will argue that innovations like group lending 
end up stunted or abort because of national policies that make 
it ~ery difficult for cost decreasing financial market inno-
vations to flourish. 
Financial Services for the Rural Poor 
Serving the rural poor is the most difficult and costly 
thing that formal financial markets do. Typically, the rural 
poor are geographically scattered, have unsatisfactory loan 
collateral, borrow and save small amounts irregularly, do not 
have established credit ratings with formal lenders, and have 
often 0ns~able inscmes that Ma~e est tion of repayment 
capacities difficult for formal lenders. 7he variations in loan 
demand make it awkward for formal lenders to 
able f~nds when they only lend to the rural poor. Permissive 
attitudes amon~ politicians toward loan r1ent may also 
make it difficult for lenders to press for repayment. Added 
to these problems, in some cases policymakers force lenders 
to provide expensive technical assistance to small borrowers, 
and at the same time require lenders to charge concessionary 
interest rates. In most LICs the expected net returns from 
lending to the rural poor are negative for most formal lenders. 
Innovators in a number of countries have hoped that group-
ing would make lending to the rural poor more attractive to 
formal lenders (Adams and Ladman). At least four advantages 
are claimed for lending to groups instead of individuals: 
(l) lenders are able to reduce their loan transaction costs by 
making one loan to a group rather than making a number of small 
individual loans, (2) when individuals are jointly liable for 
the group loan, lenders may be able to reduce loan default 
and the 1costs of collecting delinquent loans, (3) lenders may 
also reduce the costs of providing services like technical as-
sistance by working with groups rather than with individuals, 
and (4) group loans may reduce the borrower's loan transaction 
costs and make formal loans and repayment more attractive to 
small borrowers. 
The Do~inican Reoublic 
kground on t!1e :Jon:tnican ublic is use i!1 understand-
ing why group ding d there and why it is a case worth 
studyin?. Twenty years ago it would have been difficult to 
predict a prosperous future for the Dominican Republic (Clausner). 
The country had been ruled for 30 years by a heavy-hand~d die-
tator, the economy depended mainly on sugar production for its 
export earnings, it had a rapid population growth rate, a very 
weak educational system, and very few trained technicians. 
The country had modest endowments of natural resources with 
much of the country too dry or too mountainous to support in-
tensive agricultural production. The ownership by foreign 
corporations of some of the best lands and many of the mineral 
properties compounded the country's problems. A good deal of 
political instability and civil war in the mid-1960's further 
disrupted the country. 
Relatively large amounts of foreign assistance and a 
good deal of self-help over the past 15 years have resulted in 
a surprising amount of economic progress. This has occurred 
even with several years of severe drought, unstable and often 
" 
low sugar prices, hurricanes, and an epidemic of African swine 1 
fever that sharply reduced the country's swine herd. Despite 
these set-backs, the country has made steady economic progress 
and recently had an orderly transfer of government from one 
civilian president to another. With all of the current turmoil 
-~-
tnat exists in Cent Ameri8a and the Cariobean the D~minican 
R~r~blic stands out as a bri s 
ile the country has Made substantial progress it still 
faces a nt1mber of difficult l='roblerns that \~~ere cori!.DO!J.ridcci bjr 
two devastating hurricanes in 1979. These problems include a 
serious lack of inexpensive energy sources that can be used to 
substitute for increasingly costly imports of petroleum oro-
ducts. This, in turn, puts pressure on balance of payments 
and internal price stability. The country also imoorts a sig-
nificant part of its food. Continued rapid population growth 
plus covert mi~ration from Haiti continues to exoand the amount 
and extent of poverty in urban areas and even more critically 
in rural areas. 
Gradually over the past twenty years the country has de-
veloped a number of the elements needed to increase the pace 
of agricultural development. As a part of this, a good deal 
of effort has gone into expanding the number of institutions 
providing loans to agriculture, and to expanding the amount 
of money lent to farmers. About one-fifth of the farmers in 
the country now receive formal loans, but there are few formal 
~ 
savings deposit facilities readily available in rural areas. 
As can be seen in Table l, the Agricultural Bank along 
with commercial banks play a major role in providing agricul-
tural loans. The commercial banks mainly service large farmers 
while the Agricultural Bank makes about half of its loans to 
TABLE l: New Agricultural _lotJJ1S Or:ant:ea by 1>'o:r""Fr:ll Le-r-dF'r 1 "l the l1oPtini.ca.I1 fh-r,\.lJlic, 
C'U(TPnt PE: '~ -v~ ) lJ 
-~----~-~-ft·----~-- ------- ~~tnm:.---Agctcultlll'al colll1'erciy 
Year Total Bank Banksc ro# ll'ECOOP':/ ctcr~;:,f/ ________ ~~Q~_g~~ _ 
1961 7.0 3.3 3.7 
1965 26.5 21.1 5.4 
1966 33.3 20.8 12.2 - • .3 
1967 36.3 22.3 13.3 .1 ~ 0 c_.,_ 
1968 42.5 25.0 15.2 .l 2.2 
1969 42.3 28.0 12.7 .2 1.:3 .l 
1970 45.6 29.2 15.5 .2 .6 .1 
1971 48.6 30.1 16.2 .4 .8 .8 .j 
1972 55.2 31.5 21.1 .5 .'l 
1973 81.3 43.4 34.5 .5 1.'5 l.l . ' 
1974 119.4 68.0 46.9 .8 .8 ?.S .1 
1975 151.8 78.0 61.9 1.6 .8 Q.ll ,1 
1976 152.3 81.4 61.9 2.3 .6 6.') .1 
1977 170.7 83.5 73.1 2.2 " •-' 11. i .l 
1978 192.9 111.9 67.4 c>.s!Y (l 10. '"11' .1 
~ Does not include loans which large agricultural firms nEy obtain outside the country. 
b/ Tl1e official rate of exchange has been one peso per u.s. dolla1 tnroughout chc pertod covenecl by 
- tlus table. 
c/ Banco Central de la Republica D:lminicana, Boletin ll'l2nsual, various lssues. Includes lo9n to 
- Secretaria Estado de Agr'icultura for supervised credltriix)gmm, and credit for land Pefonn 
participants in Instituto Agmrio Dominicano. Year~end outstanding balance fif1,ll'es :lnsceau u+' 
new loans made during the year. 
9/ Ftmdacion D:lminicana de Iesarrollo, Boletin Estadlstico, wrious iscues. 
rij Instituto de Iesarrollo y Credit Cooperative, unpubli<>ned reports. 
y Unpublished reports by various financieras. 
f!! llnpublished reports of the Oficiana de Lesarrollo de la Comurndad and CARITi\S. 
!:¥ Estimated by authors. 
I 
'"' I 
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small and medium sized rMers ~lo~~ with l~nd reforM oarti~ipan s. 
rhe financiaras nrovide loans to lar~e onerations, .ile the 
:Gc)!f'li:r:.ican ~eve Faun tion (JDF) m~kes Most of its loans 
to the ru~al poor. The eYpansion of cultur~l credlt in the 
country has been stro:1gly supported by foreign ai::i a::encies. 
Loans and grants for about 90 million dollars have come lnto 
the country the past 20 years for this ourpose (Table 2). 
As in most coun<::ries, formal agricultural loans carry con-
cessionary interest rates. Currently the nominal interest 
rates on agricultural loans range from 8-12 percent per year, 
including service fees. In late 1979 commercial banks expected 
yields in other sectors in excess of 18 percent on well se-
cured loans with customers who had excellent credit ratings. 
Until 5 or 6 years ago the nominal interest rates in the econ-
omy generally exceeded the annual changes in the consumer price 
index. Recently, however, rates of inflation have accelerated, 
and since 1974 have generally exceeded the nominal rate of 
interest charged on agricultural credit. Individuals have re-
ceived negative real rates of interest on their savings deposits 
and those with easy access to formal credit have realized an 
1 
income transfer through borrowing at negative real rates of 
interest. 
Group Lending in the Dominican Republic 
Several organizations in the Dominican Reoublic have exper-
imented with group lending: the Oficina de Desarrollo de la 
Comunidad, the Comite de Ciudadanos, the Institute de Desarrollo 
TABLE 2: External Loans or Grants for Agr>icultural Credit i.n the wm:l.nic3.l1 Republic, 1960-'(9 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1966 
1966 
1968 
1969 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1976 
1976 
1978 
roreign Local ~ncy§/ Agency_ Am:n.iJ.t of Loan or Grant 
IDB 
IDB 
PADF 
AID 
AID 
PDAF 
mRD 
IAF 
IDB 
IDB 
AID 
AID 
IDB 
IAF 
Agr>icultural Bank 
Agr-icultural Bank 
DDF 
Agr>icultural Bank 
IDECOOP 
DDF 
C.B. (FIDE) 
DDF 
Agr'icultural Ba'1K 
IDECOOP 
SEA, DDF & Agr>icultura1 
Bank 
SEA & Agr'icultural 3ank 
Agr>icultural Bank 
PI COOP 
Total 
-Million-
$ 3.0 u.s. 
4.9 u.s. 
1.1 R.D. 
.5 u.s. 
9.5 u.s. 
2.6 u.s. 
.3 u.s. 
5.0 u.s. 
.5 u.s. 
16.8 u.s. 
8.0 u.s. 
1.6 u.s. 
9.0 u.s. 
7.0 u.s. 
16.0 u.s. 
3.5 D.R. 
~u.s. 
$89.8 
--~-~-----
Terms 
20 ys. 1-114% Ap: . CredJ t 
12 ys. 5-3/4% Livestoek 
Grant .S.F. Cn"d:l t 
40 ys. 2-1/2% At;. Credit 
40 vs. 2-1/2% Coop. Credlt 
20 vs. Groun Credit 
50 ys. 3.5% Livestoelt 
Grant GI'('ttO Credit 
ljQ ys. 1-l/4% Ag. Credit 
J1,ishery 
40 ys. 3% Ag. Credit 
40 ys. 3% Ag. Credit 
40 ys. 2% Ag. Cr>e<lit 
Ag. Credit 
----,-·-·~-
a/ Inter-Anerican Development Bank (IDB), Agency for International Developmmt (AID), Pan Arreriean 
- Development Foundation (PDAF), Vforld Bank (mRD), Inter-.1\JJErican Fol1!1dation (IAF), Dominican 
Development Foundation (DDF), Institute de Desarrollo y Credito Cogrerati vo (illECCX)P), Centra1 
Bank (CB), Secretaria Estado do Agr>icultica (SEll.), Financiera Para E1 Desarrolla y L:< Cooperativa 
(H'ICOOP). 
I 
co 
I 
-9-
c~m~ercial banks a~d JD 0 • Sorn~ of 
opment activities by various rnrr:ent tes cr 
church efforts. Still other groups were formed b lend 
agencies. A tradition of informal groups of far~ers work 
together to do joint tasks through convites provided some social 
basis for the formation of these groups. The san, an informal 
rotating savin~s credit association found throughout the country, 
also provides a traditional basis for informal groups among the 
poor (Norvell and Wehrly). 
While DDF has other development activities, loans to groups 
of small farmers make up a large part of its total efforts. 
DDF was one of the first organizations to become involved with 
group lending, and currently has the largest program of this 
type in the country. DDF's lending activities are interesting 
because they deal strictly with the poor, and because of the 
innovations involved. The roots of DDF go back to the Alliance 
for Progress initiated in the early 1960s and private sector 
interests in the Dominican Republic that felt more should be 
done ab@ut rural poverty. In its current form, DDF was legally 
organized in 1966 as a non-profit organization. Initially, a 
good deal of its funding came from private gifts, corporation 
donations, and grants from foreign foundations. As its lend-
ing activities have grown, it has relied heavily on loans and 
grants from commercial banks, government agencies, and interna-
tional aid agencies. 
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The ~ai~ a1n of DDP is to promote social and economic de-
el amon~ t 1e low income ople in rural areas (Freire). 
It .iG a relati ·ve small organization that works in seven re-
ons of the country. Its board of directors includes indi-
s who have had, or currently hold, prominent positions 
~he government and private business. The leaders of the 
ion are hi ly motivated and have a sincere interest in 
he ing the rural poor. 
While DDF does a significant part of the total lending to 
the rural poor, its loans make up only a small part of all 
money lent to agriculture. Overall, DDF handles about 2 per-
cent of the total value of new loans each year to agriculture. 
As can be noted in Table 3, recently DDF has made loans through 
groups to about three or four thousand small farmers. Most 
of these farmers do not have access to other formal sources 
of credit. The loan portfolio of DDF grew steadily from only 
about .1 million pesos in 1966-67 to about 6.3 million pesos in 
1978-79, while the value of new loans made each year increased from 
21 
about .1 million to 1.6 million.- The past several years DDF 
has found it difficult to find additional funds, nevertheless, 
to maintain or expand its volume of lending. During this perJ 
iod there has been a rise and fall in the numbers of groups 
and individuals participating. A high point in number of groups 
and individuals was reached in 1973-74 when loans were made to 
~/ The official rate of exchange has been one pesos per dollar for 
many years. The parallel market rate gives a 15-20 percent 
premium to the dollar. 
TABlE 3:'" Growth in DDF Portfolio and Lending Activities, 1966-79 
New Loans 
PortfolidY 
Nurrber Made During AverClf!J= Loan Size per 
of YearsW 
Year RD($) Groups RD($) Individuals Group Individual 
RD$ 
1966-67 106,829 42 117,670 2,081 2,802 57 
1967-68 224,541 161 216,682 2,167 1,346 100 
1969-70 376,770 160 234,822 4,461 1,468 53 
1970-71 583,004 156 387,682 4,954 2,485 78 
1971-72 836,990 257 480,264 5,726 1,869 84 I 
f-J 
1972-73 1,121,557 198 455,277 4,457 2,299 102 I-' I 
1973-74 1,712,880 393 550,172 6,923 1,400 112 
1974-75 2,481,213 248 1,758,284 5,150 7,090 396 
1975-76 3,512,307 231 2,396,142 4,440 10,373 499 
1976-77 4,512,961 189 2,282,895 4,029 12,079 567 
1977-78 5,604,726 212 2,888,244 4,668 13,624 619 
1978-79 6,323,120 124 1,602,831 2,590 12,926 619 
Source: Dominican t.eveloprrent Fomdation, Informe Anual, 1979. 
9/ Year End Balance, Jme 30. The official rate of exch~ has been one peso for one dollar 
throughout the period covered by this table. 
Q! Based on fiscal year July 1-Jme 30. 
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about 40 0 groups ;lith almost 7 thousand members. Since that 
time both numbers have declined sharply to only 124 0;roups and 
2,590 individuals in 1978-79. This reduction from 1975 to 1979 
in the numbers of groups and individuals serviced occurred 
despite a more than six-fold increase in the total loan port-
folio of DDF, and a two-fold increase in the value of new loans 
made yearly. 
Compared to other agencies trying to provide financial 
services to the poor, DDF has been quite innovative. For ex-
ample, they have blended private, corporate, ~overnment, and 
foreign aid agency interest into their activities. This has 
allowed them to draw political as well as financial support 
from a broad range of sources. It has also resulted in DDF 
pulling influential people into their program. While DDF's 
activities were largely initiated on grants and gifts, they 
have been able on occasion to gain access to regular financial 
sources to support some of their lending programs. They have 
also been quick to adopt new management tools such as computers, 
and have been able to maintain staff esprit de corps despite 
modest salaries. It was also one of the first organizations 
in the world to experiment on a large scale with group lending 
and has been quite dynamic in making various adjustments that 
were aimed at expanding and improving the effectiveness of 
group lending. As will be discussed later, DDF also has ex-
perimented with a loan guarantee program aimed at inducing 
-13-
commercial ban;,cs to service t~e rtu"al ~)Qor. 'iJ~ile doing t~is, 
DDF has been able to maintain a positive image among the influ-
ential, the rural poor and international donors and aid a~en­
cies - no small task in a world where "social minded 11 agencies 
often turn up with poor press a few years after they be 
operations. 
Th~~~echanics of Group Lending 
As mentioned earlier, some groups have been in existence 
for several years before they approach DDF for a loan. Other 
groups are drawn together by DDF coordinators. The group may 
vary in size from 10 to more than 100 individuals. Once a 
group is formed or makes contact with the coordinator, a meet-
ing is held with group members and DDF's program is explained. 
If the coordinator feels that the group is serious about work-
ing together, additional meetings are held. A coordinator may 
meet regularly with a new group for a number of months to help 
design a loanable project. This may include short courses for 
all or part of the members in production techniques critical 
to the success of the proposed project. This proving and train-
in~ period is costly for DDF, especially if the groups are 
newly formed. During the formation period the group elects 
several leaders to represent it in loan negotiations. These 
leaders also work with the DDF coordinator in preparing a 
project plan on which a loan is justified. 
Each loan is aimed at a specific production activity. The 
project, for example, might be to help finance rice production 
on land that is owned or rented by group members. lJot all 
members of the ~roup need be participants at any one time in 
the project and loan, however. Typically, the members purchase 
inputs \vi th the loan and app them to their own individual 
enterprises. He:mbers of the group may, in addition, exchange 
labor informally in planting and harvesting. 
The loan transaction is handled for DDF by any bank lo-
cated in the vicinity. The DDF transfers funds to the bank, 
who in turn issues a check in the name of the group leader. 
This check is deposited in a savings account and withdrawals 
are made as needed by the group with the signatures of the 
group leaders. The secretary of the group is responsible for 
maintaining records on who receives portions of the loan and 
also their repayment. In all cases the members of the group 
who participate in the loan agree to be jointly liable for 
repayment of the entire group loan. This agreement is not 
legally binding, however, because the informal groups are not 
legally recognized entities in the Dominican Republic. In the 
case of a loan default the DDF only has legal recourse against 
individual borrowers within the group. DDF has collection 
agents who work on recovering loans from individuals who were 1 
in groups that have disbanded, or from individuals who have 
failed to repay in on-going groups. 
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tices 
A recent study in one of the seven areas where DDF is wor~-
ing illustrates some of the stren s and we sses of DDF's 
This study was carried ut in late 1978 
in the Bonao region, a rice area located in the central part of 
the country. Bonae was one of the first regions where DDF 
started making group loans. DDF's program there is neither 
its best nor its worst. The study focused on examining the 
benefits and costs of group lending. It showed that there had 
been a good deal of instability in the number of groups receiv-
ing loans in the area. From 1966 to 1978 DDF made 244 separate 
loans to 63 groups of farmers in Bonae. In late 1978 only 23 
groups were still active and receiving loans from DDF. Several 
of the groups had disbanded because they lost interest in work-
ing as a group and getting a loan from DDF. Other groups had 
disbanded and did not repay their loan. Still other groups 
were combined to form larger groups in order to reduce DDF's 
costs of administration. 
While the reaons for group failure varied, several reasons 
were common. Those groups formed mainly for the purpose of , 
getting access to a DDF loan tended not to last very long. It 
appears that group cohesion grew out of individuals realizing 
"group goods" in addition to just access to credit. As might 
be expected, loans made to groups that had been together for 
some time prior to getting a DDF loan tended to have higher 
' ,~ 
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loan repayment rates continued existence. The fact that the 
individuals hung together as a group prior to gett1ng a DDF loan 
strongly suggests that individuals were realizi:1g "group goods" 
besides just access to DDF loans. It was also noted that groups 
that contributed a significant part of the resources that went 
into the project funded by the loan tended to have higher re-
payment performance than those groups that used the loan to 
cover most project expenses. A number of groups in one area 
had disbanded and failed to repay their loans. r1any of the 
people living there were recent migrants and had not developed 
social ties beyond the loan to bind them together. 
An analysis of the costs of nding to groups versus loans 
to individuals was not possible because DDF only makes group 
loans. It appeared, however, that there is a clear trade-off 
between keeping group lending costs down, and heloing to create, 
reinforce, and provide technical assistance to groups. Some 
of DDF's groups were already formed and had group cohesion before 
DDF came on the scene. Some of the groups, however, were formed 
by DDF. In some cases, DDF works with a newly formed group for 
up to 6 months to make sure that it was reasonably viable before 
I; 
making a loan. Group formation and supervision costs were ve~y 
substantial where on-going groups did not already exist. The fact 
that groups do not provide loan collateral also raises the expected 
lender costs of trying to collect delinquent loans. Despite these 
qualifications, it was clear that lending to groups involved 
less lender tr~nsaction costs per unit of money lent than would 
individual lo~ns to ~roup nembers. At the same time, it is 
obviously more expensive for the lender to service groups than 
it would be to lend the same amounts to more prosperous indi-
victuals who could provide secure collateral for their loans. 
A recent analysis of DDF's lending activities showed that 
the cost of lending, forming and supervising the groups amounted 
to about 20 percent of the value lent (Roach). 
The effectiveness of joint liability in encouraging loan 
repayment was also not clear cut. Some well established 
groups maintain informal vigilante committees that, in extreme 
cases, may take the law into their own hands and extract a 
piece of property from the delinquent member to cover unpaid 
loans. This type of social sanction appears to work best when 
the members in good standing in the group feel they lose a 
lot if the group does not meet its loan obligations. The 
quality of the loan service provided is an important factor 
in this. If the group has only been formed to get access to 
the loan, the group feels hasseled in getting the loan, and 
the load arrives late, group sanctions to reinforce repayment 
, 
appear to be very weak. 
As with lender costs, it was difficult to get strictly 
comparable costs of an individual borrowing through a group 
versus obtaining an individual loan from a formal lender. 
Almost none of the DDF group borrowers get individual loans 
from other formal lenders. To shed some light on this 
question, an analysis o~ total borrower loan transaction cost 
of a ten member DDF group was made. This was compared with 
similar cost incurred by 10 individual small borrowers from 
the National Agricultural Bank in the same re on. The trans-
action costs included the opportunity costs of time taken to 
negotiate the loan, interest payments and service fees, travel 
costs, and costs of borrow short term in the informal 
market to cover expenses because of delays caused by late 
formal loan disbursement. The interest and service fee charges 
were identical for DDF and the Agricultural Bank. Both the 
group and the individual borrowers were often forced to borrow 
money in the informal market to cover their production ex-
penses because the DDF and the Agricultural Bank disbursed 
their loans 30-60 days after the farmers incurred a major 
part of their production expenses. Because the group loans 
were largely negotiated by only one or two of the group 
leaders, the group members lost less work time and had to 
spend less on travel expenses than did individual borrowers. 
Overall, the group incurred loan transaction costs that were 
about 20 percent lower than did the 10 individual borrowers 
for equal amounts of money. At the same time, individuals ga11re 
up some of their freedom by being in a group. Whether this 
saving in loan transaction costs would have been sufficient 
to induce them to participate in a group loan, over an indi-
vidual loan, cannot be answered because members of the group 
had little access to formal loans outside of group participation. 
AlMost ev9ryone contacted in the st agreed that providin~ 
t~chnical assistance to the sroun was both more cost effective 
and easier than trying to do it with individuals. 
Loan Guarantee Program 
Jne of the most interestin~ innovations tried by DDF was 
a guarantee program aimed at inducing commercial banks to lend 
to groups graduated from DDF's own lending program. Leaders 
in the Foundation realized in the early 1970s that they must 
tap regular financial channels to service additional rural 
poor. In 1972, DDF received a grant from the Inter-American 
Foundation for about a half million dollars to initiate this 
guarantee effort. 
The thinking behind the program was that DDF would provide 
the commercial banks with credit references on the groups, 
continue to provide technical services to support the activities 
financed by the commercial loan, and also offer the bank a loan 
guarantee to cover part of any default: 75 percent of the amount 
lent the first year to the group, 50 percent the second year, 
and 25 percent the third year. It was hoped that the loan 
gua~antee along with the other DDF services of identifying 
and supervising the groups would provide commercial lenders 
with enough additional incentives to lend to the rural poor. 
The intent was for DDF to obtain leverage through the use of 
grant funds to guarantee a much larger amount of money lent 
to groups by commercial lenders. 
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The terms of the s marte by the banks to the groups were 
those generally used by the DDF and the Agricultural Bank. The 
loans carried an interest rate of 8 percent, plus a 2 percent 
serv·ice charge fee. The coPliTlercial banks \'lere able to increase 
their effective yields on these group loans to about ll percent 
by deducting the interest payment and service fee in advance 
from the principal lent to the groups. In 1973 when the guaran-
teed loans were first made by commercial banks, the expected 
yields from well secured commercial loans ranged from 11 to 
13 percent. By deducing interest in advance, charging 10 per-
cent, relying on DDF to cover some lending costs, and having a 
loan guarantee for 75 percent of the loan value, banks in 1973 
expected returns from group loans approximately equal to those 
they could realize from other lo~~s. Furthermore, DDF had 
several members on its board of directors from the banking 
community who were able to encourage important banks to go out 
of their way to promote a worthy cause. In 1973, four major 
banks began to make loans to groups under the guarantee program. 
Two of these banks were foreign owned and their participation 
may have been related to public relations. The number of groups 
t 
served under the guarantee program expanded rapidly in 1973-7~ 
but then tailed off and by 1978 no commercial bank was willing 
to participate. This occurred despite the fact that repayment 
rates had been excellent and DDF was called upon to pay for 
only a small amount of defaulted loans out of guarantee funds. 
- l-
A total of 220 loans were orovided for a total of alMost 2 miJ-
j Lon pesos r this c~ram of ~uarantees during the 1973-77 
period. 
Various explanations have been offered for this very 
interesting and promising innovation started with a bang, yet 
failed. It appears that both DDF and the banks lost interest 
in continuing the guarantee pro~ram. DDF's enthusiasm waned 
because it continued to incur significant costs to help its 
best groups prepare loan proposals for bank funding. DDF also 
incurred expenses to supervise the loans and help in loan re-
covery. Since the banks kept all of the interest oayment, DDF 
received no revenue to off-set their costs of serving loans 
made under the guarantee program. 
Bankers mentioned a number of reasons for pulling out of 
the program. Some mention the declinin~ portion of the loan 
orincipal covered by the guarantee as being a factor. Others 
suggest that droughts durin~ the mid-1970s in the country made 
it more risky to lend to a~riculture and esoecially to those 
borrowers without adequate collateral. Still others argue 
th~t these types of group loans cost them more to administer 
than they had expected. Also during the period 1972-78, DDF 
began to experience more difficulties overall in maintaining 
high repayment records among its groups. This made the credit 
worthiness of DDF's portfolio less attractive to commercial 
lenders. 
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Other less well recognized forces were also at work that 
caused commercial banks to back away from the group lending. 
In 1973 the rate of inflation in the country began to accelerate. 
Prior to this time, the nominal rates of interest paid on agri-
cultural loans generally exceeded the rates of inflation, and 
positive real rates of interest were in force. Since 1973, 
however, the rates of inflation have generally exceeded the 
nominal rates of interest on agricultural loans. This has re-
sulted in excess demand for these ne~atively priced loans, 
and has caused banks to severely ration these cheap loans away 
from the rural poor. Further, the opportunity cost of money 
lent at concessionary rates to agriculture has gone up sub-
stantially. As mentioned earlier, the effective yield on com-
mercial loans moved up to exceed 18 percent the past several 
years. It appears that banks were willing to participate in 
a program that may have been only marginally profitable to 
them initially, but with an increase in inflation and a jump 
in returns that could be realized from loans to other sectors, 
the banks made a profit maximizing decision that pushed the 
rural poor and the DDF aside. 
It is doubtful if even a steady guarantee of 100 percent 
would have convinced the banks to continue lending to groups 
at effective yields of about 11 percent when they could get 
18 percent on their loanable funds, at lower loan transaction 
costs per unit of money lent, by shifting all their funds to 
traditional clients. In this case, interest rate re ations 
ept costs of formal c it dnwn for the r~ral poor, but formal 
lenders were unwilling, DDF ~nable to provide loans at t~ese 
prices. This forced t~e rural poor to qo to informal lenders 
who charged higher rates and/or to do without additional formal 
loans. 
Conclusions 
Despite a number of substantial accomplishments, DDF is 
faced with some very tough problems. As might be expected, 
individuals, corporations, and foreign foundations are not 
interested in indefinitely supporting an agency. Foundations, 
especially, like to view their grants as seed money that will 
flower into a self-perpetuating perennial. While DDF has been 
highly successful in attracting grants from foundations, these 
foundations generally only want to give DDF one or two grants. 
DDF has been able, with difficulties, to draw funds from regular 
financial channels, but these sources of loans look carefully 
at DDF's balance sheet, may have strong political overtones or 
demand that their revenue exceed their costs for the loan. 
~ 
f At least two major factors make it difficult for DDF to 
become a regular part of the financial community. The first is 
the DDF has incurred some repayment problems among its groups. 
In the initial stages of DDF's group lending program, they re-
ported excellent repayment performance. In recent years, how-
ever, a higher proportion of DDFs loans are not repaid, or are 
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repaid late. Part of this deterioration in repayment performance 
is due to debt refinancing in the early part of DDF's program 
that made repayment appear to be better than in fact it was. 
That is, DDF refinanced loans to certain groups that were un-
able or unwilling to repay loans and these did not appear as 
repayment problems until several years later when DDF finally 
decided not to refinance the group. Secondly it is also apparent 
that the quality of loan services provided by DDF has not im-
proved over the past few years. DDF has been forced to economize 
on the amount of technical assistance and supervision that it 
gives groups. Fewer groups and fewer total people serviced 
were parts of this change. Even more important, because of re-
payment problems, erosion of the purchasing power of DDF's loan 
portfolio by inflation, and their difficulties in getting ac-
cess to additional loanable funds, DDF does not have enough 
funds to meet loan demand among its groups. This has resulted 
in loan disbursements to groups arriving up to several months 
after crops are planted. This forces the group to rely on in-
formal lenders for several months to fund the part of their 
activities covered by DDF loans. The added cost of borrowing 
from the informal market, and the late arrival of DDF loans, 
has caused borrowers to feel that the quality of DDF's loan 
services has deteriorated. As a result, some groups delay 
repaying a loan so that they can finance their next crop. Other 
groups or individuals may default altogether on their loans be-
cause they feel that maintaining a good credit rating with an 
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~gency that is becoming less able to supply their fin~ncial 
n~ed is not worth all that nuch. Said another way, it may be 
that a ~ood credit rating with DDF is worth less now than it 
was a few years ago because the quality of DDF's financial 
services has declined. 
It is surprising how many organizations like DDF start 
with a flourish, receive a number of grants to start their 
program, show very promising initial results, but then run 
into rough water about the time that grant agencies decide 
they want the agency to stand on its own feet. In large part 
these problems can be explained by simple comoarison of costs 
and revenues. Basically, DDF has a program that is costing 
it 20 cents or more of every peso lent to run while they are 
only charging 10 cents for every peso lent. Without a contin-
ual inflow of grants or subsidies amounting to at least 10 per-
cent of their loan portfolio they cannot maintain the nominal 
value of their loanable funds. This assumes that they recover 
most of their loans. If the loan default amounts to 10 percent 
per year, other things being equal, DDF's loan portfolio will 
essenti~lly evaporate in about 5 years. If the rate of inflation 
' is significantly greater than the nominal rate of interest rate, 
which it currently is in the Dominican Republic, the purchasing 
power of the loan portfolio will erode even more quickly. With-
out an outside subsidy on a regular basis, DDF cannot present a 
strong financial statement to potential funding agencies. 
Despite the aggresstve and innovative beginntn~s of DDF, 
it has not been able to develop innovations in financial inter-
mediation that would allow it to service the financial needs 
of the rural poor, to maintain its own financial viability, 
and at the same time charge only 10 percent for its services. 
The agency is trying to provide a service at a price that will 
not cover its costs. Our opinion is that they have been running 
a lean shop and have kept their costs about as low as one could 
expect. To further reduce the average cost of lending would 
probably reduce the quality of DDF's services and further erode 
the incentives that borrowers have to maintain good credit rat-
ings with the agency. The concessionary interest rate policies 
that so many countries insist on pursuing may be a major factor 
that causes many financial innovations to end up stunted or 
abort. Many of the innovations may be cost decreasing, but 
they do not decrease cost enough to allow agencies to sustain 
themselves with cheap interest rate policies. 
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